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ESSAY
People's Court
Nicholas S. Zeppos*
I. INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court's opinion in Bowers v. Hardwick' contains the
usual cant about the legitimacy of the judicial function. In holding that
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment does not recognize
a fundamental right to practice homosexual sodomy, the Court cau-
tioned that "[t]he Court is most vulnerable and comes nearest to illegit-
imacy when it deals with judge-made constitutional law having little or
no cognizable roots in the language or design of the Constitution. '2
What exactly did the Court mean? That the public would refuse to
obey judicial judgments if the Court were to recognize rights not "found
in" the Constitution? That the public would disregard Court rulings
that at least partially reflected the Justices' policy judgments rather
than being based on so-called "neutral principles?" That constitutional
law scholars would decry the Court's use of policy analysis in
interpretation?
All of these consequences are unlikely for a variety of reasons.
Throughout history the Court has recognized rights not "found in" the
Constitution without jeopardizing the Court's legitimacy.3 The public at
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University School of Law; University of Wisconsin,
B.A., 1976, J.D., 1979. Thanks to Professors Rebecca Brown, Barry Friedman, Margaret Howard,
and Bob Rasmussen for their helpful comments.
1. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
2. Id. at 194.
3. See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (invalidating state law limit-
ing access to contraceptives); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating state law
limiting access of married couples to contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (invalidating state law denying access to private school education); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262
U.S. 390 (1923) (invalidating state law prohibiting teaching of foreign law in school). Typically,
these cases fall under the label of substantive due process. For an effort to link the concept of
substantive due process to the origins of the Constitution, see Riggs, Substantive Due Process in
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large is unlikely to know what is or is not "in" the Constitution. Most
people are ignorant about its contents" or overtly disagree with some of
its contents.5 Academics may critique the Court's forays into policy
analysis.6 But even this form of scholarly attack is increasingly rare,7
and no link between scholarly critique and public acceptance of the
Court's judgments has been established.8 If anything did matter to the
public it probably would be the result. Judge Robert Bork's failed ef-
fort9 to educate the public on the alleged indefensibility of the reason-
ing in Griswold v. Connecticut0 and Bolling v. Sharpe" demonstrates
that judicial methodology may be of little interest to a citizenry whose
everyday lives can be governed by what it considers objectionable
results.
Unpacking the Court's "legitimacy" discussion in Bowers v. Hard-
wick reveals some preoccupation with the public's vision of law and le-
gal interpretation. Yet it is improbable that the public learns about law
only from the opinions of the judiciary. Other sources of information
include newspapers, books, television, personal experience, or word of
mouth. The public's image of law unquestionably is shaped by what
lawyers would describe as "extra-legal" sources. 12
1791, 1990 Wis. L. REv. 941.
4. Periodic surveys of public knowledge about the Constitution produce some startling re-
sults. A 1987 survey showed that about 64% of those polled believed that the Framers made Eng-
lish the national language. Nearly half believed that during time of war or national emergency the
President could suspend constitutional protections. This number no doubt was reduced by the fact
that only 41% even knew that the first ten amendments are called the Bill of Rights. A majority
also believed that the Constitution includes the Marxist slogan "From each according to his ability
to each according to his need." Allen, Secrets of the Constitution, Wash. Post, Apr. 20, 1987, at
B1.
5. The 1987 survey shows that the public seemingly has numerous ideas for improving the
document. About 61% favored a constitutional convention to consider amendments on school
prayer, abortion, and freedom of the press. About 75% favored a constitutional amendment guar-
anteeing each citizen adequate health care, and 70% favored an amendment requiring a reappoint-
ment process for Supreme Court Justices. See Marcus, Constitution Confuses Americans; Public
Ill-Informed on U.S. Blueprint, Wash. Post, Feb. 17, 1987, at A13.
6. See, e.g., Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MIcH. L. REv. 1835
(1988).
7. See Smith, The Pursuit of Pragmatism, 100 YALE L.J. 409, 427 (1990).
8. See Chase, Toward a Legal Theory of Popular Culture, 1986 Wis. L. REv. 527, 528-29.
9. See Nomination of Robert H. Bork to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States, Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Comm., 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 115-17, 285-
87 (1987).
10. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
11. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
12. See Macaulay, Images of Law in Everyday Life: The Lessons of School, Entertainment,
and Spectator Sports, 21 LAw & Soc'y RE V. 185 (1987); Symposium: Popular Legal Culture, 98
YALE L.J. 1545 (1989). The link is demonstrated further by surveys on public knowledge about the
Constitution because the public always scores highly on criminal justice issues. See Marcus, supra
note 5. The dominance of criminal law on television likely accounts for this knowledge. Television
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One such obvious source of knowledge is literature. Law has a way
of working itself into literature, both popular"3 and classic.'4 This raises
many interesting questions. Can literature profitably shed light on legal
issues or jurisprudential questions? Do readers draw a view of law from
works of literature? If so, do they believe what they read? Do authors
even care about their portrayals of law in their works of fiction? These
provocative questions have generated substantial debate and discus-
sion. ' 5 For my purposes, however, I view them as largely irrelevant, or
as a given. It is difficult to deny that popular culture plays some role in
contributing to the public's perception of law and legal institutions."6
That being so, what messages do people get about law from works of
literature? Do the messages differ from those transmitted through more
formal legal channels, like Bowers v. Hardwick?
I offer a tentative examination of this topic by examining Scott
Turow's recent work The Burden of Proof.17 The book is a worthwhile
subject for a number of reasons. It has widespread popularity among
both lawyers and nonlawyers. Turow is a lawyer who writes about the
law and legal characters. His work draws extensively on his personal
experiences, particularly his tenure as an Assistant United States Attor-
ney (AUSA) in the Northern District of Illinois. Whether intended or
not, the book develops a view of law throughout that is of interest not
only to lawyers, but any reader with a sense of curiosity about law and
legal institutions.
II. AN INSIDER'S VIEW
The protagonist of Turow's work is Alejandro ("Sandy") Stern, one
of the elite of the criminal defense bar in a Midwestern city with obvi-
ous similarities to Chicago, Turow's own legal milieu. Turow's fictional
Kindle County and its complex politico-legal structure no doubt is
based on the equally alliterative Cook County, Illinois. Readers of
Turow's first book, Presumed Innocent, s will recall Stern as Rusty
hardly is accurate in its portrayal of criminal law. On basic issues, such as the right to a lawyer or
trial by jury, however, television probably gives viewers some idea of what the Constitution
requires.
13. See, e.g., P. FRIEDMAN, REASONABLE DOUBT (1990); T. WOLFE, BONFIRE OF THE VANITIES
(1987); H. WOUK, THE CAINE MUTINY (1951).
14. See, e.g., C. DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE (1977); F. KAFKA, THE TRIAL (1956); H. MELVILLE,
BILLY BUDD (1948).
15. For a skeptical view, see R. POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION
(1988). It seems to me that Judge Richard Posner's more recent attention to the rhetorical form of
judicial opinions represents a retreat from his earlier skepticism. See R. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY
IN REPUTATION (1990)
16. See sources cited supra note 12.
17. S. TUROW. THE BURDEN OF PROOF (1990).
18. S. TUROW, PRESUMED INNOCENT (1987).
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Sabitch's defense lawyer. Here, however, Stern and his practice are
center stage. The book is a character study of Stern the lawyer, father,
husband, brother, and person.
The book's plot is a bit convoluted and at times unbelievable. 19 Be-
ing mostly a character study of Stern, the plot at first moves slowly,
then gathers pace, and is tied up all too neatly at the end. The book
opens with Stern discovering his wife Clara dead from an apparent sui-
cide."0 As he comes to terms with the suicide and the reason for it Stern
is revealed to the reader and to himself. Readers come to know Stern
through his interactions and encounters with his children, his lovers, his
sister, his opposing counsel, and his client and brother-in-law. Through
all of this, sex, and a sexually transmitted disease, help move the plot
along. What really carries the plot, though, and ultimately serves as the
test for Stern's character (as well as the explanation for Clara's suicide),
is a grand jury investigation into the activities of Dixon Hartnell,
Stern's brother-in-law and high-flying, high-living commodities trader.
A federal grand jury begins investigating certain trades at Dixon's
brokerage house. Stern naturally defends his regular client. Here,
Turow applies his considerable talents to develop a complex family and
lawyer-client relationship and to reveal the workings of the legal sys-
tem. As Stern and Dixon proceed through the investigation-often as
adversaries-Turow unmistakably reveals his vision of the law. It is a
world of us and them, of insiders and outsiders. Lawyers are part of an
elite, mandarin class who must shepherd people through a system they
do not and could not hope to understand, much less master. Turow's
legal world is not one of rules accessible to all, but a secret culture of
insider knowledge in which results turn not on the words of the Consti-
tution, a statute, or a rule of criminal procedure, but on knowledge of
personalities and custom. Only those from within can understand and
manipulate this system.2 '
From the start Stern is the ultimate insider. In his struggle to un-
derstand Clara's tragedy, Stern enlists the assistance of his usual neme-
sis, the police. Stern, however,- benefits from the lifelong gratitude of
Lieutenant Radcyzk, whose brother Stern had represented successfully
in an earlier investigation into police corruption.2 Stern accomplished
this feat not by knowing the "law," or even crafting a brilliant appellate
19. Perhaps this is the common lawyer's complaint about the book. See Russell, Assessing
the Summer's Sizzler: Exaggerated, Unrealistic, Unwieldy "Burden," Legal Times, July 16, 1990,
at 66, col. 1.
20. S. TUROW, supra note 17, at 4.
21. The point has been noted by others. See Maas, Scott Turow's New Mystery, N.Y. Times,
June 3, 1990, § 7, at 1, col. 1.
22. S. TUROW, supra note 17, at 147-48.
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brief. His task, instead, was to "touch[] the pressure points, like some-
one who knew jujitsu."'2
Throughout the grand jury investigation of Dixon, Stern's defense
depends extensively on his special relationship with federal prosecutors.
Familiarity with the judge, not just legal precedents, drives his legal
advice. 4 When aspiring young trial lawyers pay Stern a compliment
they applaud his "sleight of hand. '25 He is at once magician and jujitsu
master.
Stern uses these skills in the course of the investigation. But the
game is not one-sided. Opposing counsel also is steeped in this lore and
culture, and is quite capable of pushing the pressure points. In this
game lawyers measure their opposing counsel's tactics like chess grand
masters. Actions obscure to the uninitiated are translated easily by
Stern. The government's broad subpoena request is, to Stern, a stan-
dard tactic warranting a canny countermeasure.26 The customary, but
"extra-legal," pregrand jury meeting between Stern, his witness, and
the AUSA in charge of the case is Stern's chance to better read the
prosecutor's game plan.2 7
If, for Turow, only lawyers participate in this informal game, it is,
nonetheless, a game with its own set of rules. A special code of
honor-"custom"-governs Stern and Klonsky, his part-time antago-
nist, and unrequited lover, in the Office of the United States Attorney.28
Conduct that each perceive to be unacceptable quickly draws a rebuke
when measured against what all lawyers know to be the rules.2 1 While
sparring over Dixon's future, however, they still remain friends. They
even take the time to share a hot tub after Stern has tried to extract
critical information from her on the course of the investigation. To-
ward the end of the book, when the tension mounts as Stern faces the
prospect of being called to testify before the grand jury, the judge (a
friend of Stern's) admonishes all present (only lawyers) to resolve
things amicably: "I don't like to see lawyers in the grand jury [room]." 31
Against this background it is not surprising that nonlawyers sur-
vive in the system only when protected by competent counsel. Targets
of grand jury investigations are lost in a "storm" 32 and left only in their
23. Id. at 148.
24. Id. at 178.
25. Id. at 269.
26. Id. at 212.
27. Id. at 274.
28. Id. at 291.
29. Id. at 361.
30. Id. at 326-27.
31. Id. at 378.
32. Id. at 194.
1991]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
"lawyer's hands."33 The client's plight is predictable since, for the
layperson, the language of the law is "foreign." 3 Through all of this the
lawyer must save the client, often from the client's own impulses. Stern
attends a meeting with one of Dixon's closest employees, Margy (whom
Stern sleeps with), and AUSA Klonsky, to discuss Margy's forthcoming
grand jury appearance. When Margy, without prodding from Stern,
seeks to volunteer information to the prosecutor, her counsel must
physically restrain her.35 Yet even here Turow tells the reader there are
limits. The best lawyer could "never save clients from themselves." 6 If
they had only listened to their lawyer.
Turow is not preoccupied entirely with the internal culture of the
legal system. The more formal aspects of law do appear, but usually
only to demonstrate the ignorance of the layperson. Stern's son-in-law,
John, who works for Dixon, is about to become a grand jury witness.
When Stern mentions that John will need a different lawyer Dixon
blandly responds "if you think so. ' '37 The comment evokes a "stern"
lecture to Dixon on conflict of interest rules.38 Stern's lover, Helen,
raises the age-old question of the defense lawyer representing people
known to be guilty. Stern's "More-esque" response counters the layper-
son's impatience with the orderly functioning of the legal system.39
On other occasions when Turow discusses more formal legal rules
they appear to be absurd or unrealistic to the layperson, but easily un-
derstandable to the lawyer. For example, after his wife's death Stern is
told about the distribution of her estate. Stern learns that shortly
before her death Clara had a certified check issued for $850,000, leaving
Stern nothing from the estate.40 Stern and the reader suspect foul play
or unscrupulous maneuverings. Was Clara blackmailed? Stern learns
that the check has not yet been paid. The solution seems easy: stop
payment on the check. For the layperson this is quite reasonable. But
the reader is told quickly that this is illegal. Stopping payment would
constitute wrongful dishonor subjecting the bank to considerable liabil-
ity.4 1 This restraint may seem too much for the layperson. A man's wife
33. Id. at 196.
34. Id. at 228.
35. Id. at 283.
36. Id. at 280.
37. Id. at 183.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 202.
40. Id. at 186.
41. Id. at 188. Actually, the result suggested by Turow (Sandy's inability to stop payment)
may be right, but the explanation (the bank's fear of a suit for wrongful dishonor) may be wrong.
A purchaser cannot stop payment on a certified check. See U.C.C. § 4-403 (1989) (stating that a
stop order is untimely after the payor has certified the check). The certified check is a contract
between the bank and the payee. The bank may decide voluntarily not to pay on the check, as a
[Vol. 44:847
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is found dead from suicide. He then discovers that shortly before her
death she used her considerable wealth (and his legacy) and had drawn
a certified check for some mysterious payee and for unknown purposes.
Can't Stern hold up payment to find out what is going on? Only the
true insider would see otherwise. The negotiability rule for a certified
check is not some silly doctrine. It allows for the free flow of large and
complex commercial transactions." Sellers of goods should not have to
worry about the creditworthiness of an unknown buyer. A certified
check guarantees payment.
Formal law is portrayed as impervious to human needs. As the in-
vestigation continues Stern is tempted to enlist the aid of his sister Syl-
via, Dixon's wife, to control Dixon's increasingly suspicious and
destructive activities. 43 Again, this may seem reasonable. Unable to get
through to Dixon, Stern turns to his sister. Here again the law erects
another artificial, but perhaps necessary, barrier. Stern's discussions
with his sister would not be privileged. Stern laments that law is
marked by its "obliviousness to family affection."'44
Turow uses law in another interesting respect. Invariably the
health of Stern's personal relationships are related directly to the char-
acter's proximity to the law. His adolescent crush on AUSA Klonsky is
almost sappy. His relationship with his daughter Marta is close and
genuinely affectionate. She is a lawyer who demonstrates her love for
her father by defending him (brilliantly and on short notice) in his
grand jury fiasco. 4" Stern's estrangement from his son Peter is palpable
and painful, but predictable: Peter is a doctor and the two professions
hold each other in contempt.46 Ties to the law serve as a security blan-
ket and litmus test for Stern's personal and professional life. As lawyer
courtesy to a customer on whose behalf the check was issued. See J. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNI-
FORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 18-5, at 792-93 (3d ed. 1988). The holder of the certified check then can
sue the bank for breach of contract. See id. In that suit the bank may not be able to assert any
defenses that the customer might have. See Thompson v. Wright, 53 Ga. App. 875, 187 S.E. 311
(1936); Louis Facigno Enters. v. Massachusetts Bank & Trust Co., 14 Mass. App. Ct. 92, 436
N.E.2d 993 (1982); Abilities Inc. v. Citibank, N.A., 87 A.D.2d 831, 449 N.Y.S.2d 242 (1982). Wrong-
ful dishonor has no application to Clara's check because the U.C.C. gives a cause of action for
wrongful dishonor to the payor bank's customer, not to the payee of the check. See U.C.C. § 4-402
(1989). Thus, Clara's bank could refuse to pay the check and be liable in a subsequent suit by the
payee on the check.
42. See State ex rel. Chan Siew Lai v. Powell, 536 S.W.2d 14 (Mo. 1976); National Newark &
Essex Bank v. Giordano, 111 N.J. Super. 347, 268 A.2d 327 (Law Div. 1970); Lawrence, Making
Cashier's Checks and Other Bank Checks Cost-Effective: A Plea for Revision of Articles 3 and 4
of the Uniform Commercial Code, 64 MINN. L. REv. 275, 279-81 (1980).
43. S. TUROW, supra note 17, at 395.
44. Id. at 396.
45. Id. at 376-79.
46. See Brinkley, Doctors v. Lawyers: A Real Nasty Fight, N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1986, § A, at
18, col. 3.
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and parent, he is most comfortable and in control when in his legal
domain. It is a game at which he excels, and through it barriers between
children (Marta) and even opponents (AUSA Klonsky) are overcome.
At the end of the book, when Stern is losing control quickly-both per-
sonally and professionally-the reason seems obvious. He is now the
target of the grand jury investigation. He is now the outsider, out-
flanked by the legal system and his family members, who as informant
(son Peter), defense counsel (daughter Marta), and coconspirators
(daughter Kate, son-in-law John, brother-in-law Dixon, and apparently
even wife Clara) nudge him from insider to outsider. The book ends
with a somewhat imperfect resolution for Stern. The future remains un-
certain. Some relationships are destroyed, others are only in need of
mending. The reader hopes for Stern's happiness, suspecting that he
again must assume the role of magician or jujitsu master, or guide the
client lost in the storm.
III. "REAL" LAW
Turow's vision of law as elitist or clubby should come as no sur-
prise given his background and plot choice. As a criminal AUSA in the
Northern District of Illinois, he undoubtedly practiced in a world simi-
lar to Stern's. With the significant power and resources of the United
States, an AUSA conducting a grand jury investigation operates in a
nonadversarial posture with a relatively open-ended mandate. The
AUSA, who alone has access to the secret grand jury proceedings, is the
ultimate insider.4 As much as any area, this practice is dominated by
the informal (for example, granting immunity to specific witnesses).49
Had Turow chosen a different legal context his view of law might have
been different. Yet, regardless of the context, Turow's vision of law
raises intriguing questions. People's perception of law often mirrors
Turow's story. Law is perceived as elitist, clubby-an insider's game.50
If this is the way that popular fiction portrays the law, is it a view em-
bodied in law itself? What do judges tell people about the law? Is law
the stuff of Sandy Stern's world-insular, esoteric, mystical? Or is it
more real and human, responsive to and shaped by the public's needs?
Courts often give mixed messages. These mixed messages may re-
present a jurisprudential gulf as wide as the literary gulf between the
works of Turow and the works of Shakespeare.
47. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-44 (1974).
48. See United States v. Sells Eng'g, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 424, 428-29 (1983).
49. See Pillsbury Co. v. Conboy, 459 U.S. 248, 254 (1983); 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1988).
50. See Sarat & Felstiner, Lawyers and Legal Consciousness: Law Talk in the Divorce Law-
yer's Office, 98 YALE L.J. 1663 (1989).
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Consider the plurality opinion written by Justice Scalia in Burn-
ham v. Superior Court.5 1 The issue in Burnham was whether a state
may exercise jurisdiction over a person who was served while present in
the state-the problem of transient jurisdiction. The Court in Burnham
unanimously held that on the facts presented-a father on a business
trip to California who, while there, visited his children and was served
by his former spouse-the state properly exercised personal jurisdic-
tion. The Court agreed, however, on little else. Justice Brennan's con-
curring opinion, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and O'Connor,
concluded 52 that the exercise of jurisdiction was proper under the "fair
play and substantial justice" standard established previously in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington.3 Writing for himself, Chief Justice
Rehnquist, and Justice Kennedy, Justice Scalia concluded that a state
can obtain personal jurisdiction over a person who is served while pres-
ent in the state."' In adopting this clear physical presence rule Justice
Scalia rejected the more nebulous fair play and substantial justice test
set forth in International Shoe and Shaffer v. Heitner55 and employed
in Justice Brennan's concurring opinion. For Justice Scalia the consti-
tutionality of governmental action turns on a test of tradition.5 6 If a
practice was widely accepted at the time the Constitution was adopted,
the Court cannot strike it down. A contrary approach, according to Jus-
tice Scalia, would allow the Court to sit as a group of platonic guardians
imposing their values on the public. 57
One is tempted to say that Justice Scalia's vision of the law pro-
nounced in Burnham is the antithesis of Turow's elitism. His call for
clear, bright-line rules in place of multifactor balancing tests58 provides
people with fair notice and predictability of what the law is. His opin-
ions indicate that he takes this point very seriously. In Burnham, for
example, he defends the physical presence test by noting that it was a
"continuing tradition, which anyone entering California should have
known about."59 By contrast, the uncertain multifactor balancing test
allows only for ex post determinations reflecting the judge's personal
view of justice. Justice Scalia's tendency to emphasize the plain mean-
51. 110 S. Ct. 2105 (1990) (plurality decision).
52. Id. at 2120 (Brennan, J., concurring).
53. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
54. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2117-19 (plurality opinion).
55. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
56. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2117-19 (plurality opinion).
57. Id. at 2119 (plurality opinion).
58. See Zeppos, Legislative History and the Interpretation of Statutes: Toward a Fact-
Finding Model of Statutory Interpretation, 76 VA. L. REV. 1295 (1990).
59. Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2118 (plurality opinion).
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ing of the text of statutes 0 and the Constitution61 and to read words as
the general population would understand them6 2 allows people to better
conform their conduct to the law. This curbing of judicial power pre-
vents the Court-an elite, life-tenured, unelected institution-from set-
ting aside those judgments of the people as represented by the elected
branches of government.
Looked at more closely, however, the Burnham approach is that of
the mandarin judge. It is a legal world as cloistered, elite, and insular as
the defense bar of Kindle County. What counts is the legal tradition at
the time of the adoption of the Constitution. For the most part, this
information will be accessible only to lawyers. Even more striking, how-
ever, the governing tradition is one made by lawyers and judges long
dead and is hardly representative of our present-day society.
This legal world is closed in yet another way: It fears that judges
will make policy decisions. The apparent solution is to turn even fur-
ther inward. In this interpretive world answers to all legal questions are
found "in the law"--text, tradition, or the internal structure or logic of
constitutional, statutory, and common law. Only a person versed in
mining these purely legal sources can declare what the law is and what
it is not.63 And most assuredly what it is not is what society may need
or demand. 4 For example, the facts giving rise to Burnham or the con-
sequences of the physical presence rule are not relevant to the purely
legal inquiry.
A curious policy-minded judge faced with Burnham may ask a host
of questions. How often is physical presence used to obtain jurisdic-
tion? Is it used overwhelmingly to get jurisdiction over absent former
spouses in child support and custody disputes?65 If the rule becomes a
recognized part of domestic relations law will it deter a parent from
visiting children, particularly in a case like Burnham in which the par-
ent's trip to California was primarily for business purposes? Will par-
ents seek to avoid Burnham by flying children to visit them rather than
traveling to the state of residence of the former spouse? Will this added
cost decrease the frequency of visits or adversely affect the children?
Will a parent enter into a previsit contract with the other parent agree-
60. See Eskridge, The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990); Zeppos, supra note 58,
at 1299-1300.
61. See Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988); Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987). Here, how-
ever, he has been inconsistent. See Zeppos, Justice Scalia's Textualism-The "New" New Legal
Process, 12 CARDoZO L. REV. 1597 (1991).
62. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 109 S. Ct. 1981, 1994 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
63. See Zeppos, supra note 61, at 1623.
64. See Burnham, 110 S. Ct. at 2118-19 (plurality opinion).
65. See Kulko v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978).
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ing not to serve process during the visit? Will such terms be included
as a matter of course in initial divorce-custody decrees? Will strategic
bargaining occur in a broader context? Will states voluntarily curb the
use of presence as a jurisdictional predicate out of fear of retaliatory
measures taken by other states?6
These questions may be interesting, but they may not be a basis for
judicial results. The court's denying the autonomy of law would be to
allow the judge's individual views to shape interpretation.6 7 This view
of the law carves out decisional domains for courts and legislatures and
arrogates to courts a special interpretive function that denies policy
choice. The judicial role is preserved as unique and untainted by the
temptations of power or judgment that may affect other
decisionmakers.
Why do these formalist justifications dominate the judicial craft
long after the basic insights of the legal realists have revealed choice in
judging? Perhaps a less sinister explanation is that judges act out of
habit or acculturation. The judge's resort to formalist reasoning is as
habitual and unreflective as the well-mannered diner's resort to the
proper salad fork. If judicial rhetoric is designed consciously to influ-
ence the popular conception of law, however, the motivations are more
troubling. The methodology is largely accepted because academic criti-
cisms of formalist reasoning have little impact. The public at large cares
little about law in general or judicial methodology. The public may be
completely ignorant of the judicial decision-making process. To the ex-
tent the public has some rudimentary understanding, they have been so
inculcated with the notion of determinacy in judicial decision making
that they have no reason to believe otherwise. The point of formalist
reasoning is to legitimate judicial power by not disturbing the compla-
cency held by most people.
This vision of the law is far more elitist than Turow could portray.
Nothing changes in judicial rhetoric because the public pays no atten-
tion or simply knows no better. If the public is curious the courts' opin-
ions provide false information. Judges contribute to the latter by
overtly denying choice in judging, as in Burnham, or by controlling the
66. For a provocative and novel analysis of choice of law problems from the perspective of
strategic decision making, see Kramer, Return of the Renovoi (unpublished manuscript on file
with the Author).
67. For devastating critiques of the reasoning in Burnham, see Hay, Transient Jurisdiction,
Especially over International Defendants: Critical Comments on Burnham v. Superior Court,
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 593 and Maier & McCoy, A Unifying Theory for Judicial Jurisdiction and
Choice of Law, - AM. J. CoMP. L. - (1991) (forthcoming).
68. See R. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 189-90 (1990); Altman, Beyond Candor,
89 MICH. L. REv. 296 (1990); Zeppos, Judicial Candor and Statutory Interpretation, 78 GEO. L.J.
353 (1989).
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flow of information.6 9 The business of the judiciary is not suited for
traditional media coverage.70 The result is troubling: a cloistered judici-
ary renders judgments allegedly unaffected by policy demands, and
these judgments then are interpreted for the public by a specialized me-
dia trained to explain legal opinions to the masses. Thus, law that
started out looking open and democratic now is revealed as akin to the
ancient Greek practice in which laws were known to and applied by an
elite group of thesmothetai.7 '
This portrayal of the relationship between the judicial product and
the public's knowledge and perception of law is distressing. About the
best that can be said is that judicial methodology is irrelevant, and
therefore, a little bit of lying never really hurts. It is not clear, however,
that the judicial product and people's lives or the consequences of legal
rules have to be so disconnected. A different judicial tradition coexists
with the Burnham approach. It is the approach of legal pragmatism
that bases law not on abstract theory but on the practice and experi-
ence of those whose conduct the law seeks to reach. Under this vision,
law is not mandarin, separate from the people. Law is involved inti-
mately with society's needs and demands. Legal interpretation does not
require resort to a closed set of legal authorities accessible only to law-
yers and judges. Instead, an informed judgment of the consequences
that the ptential outcome will have on society shapes the results. 73 Le-
gal pragmatism concedes choice in judging, with new information and
experience leading to an evolving set of rules that better meets societal
demands.
This difference in approach suggests differences in methodology
that portray law in a far different manner. Consider the problems that
arise when the law of divorce intersects with bankruptcy law. Suppose a
married couple divorces, owning a home with $15,000 in equity and
$5000 worth of other marital property. The divorce decree divides the
assets equally, $10,000 to each spouse. The decree gives the husband
the house and custody of the two children. The wife receives the $5000
in marital assets. Additionally, the decree orders the husband to pay
. 69. See Scalia, Assorted Canards of Contemporary Legal Analysis, 40 CASE W. RES. 586, 589
(1990).
70. See Mauro, Justice Scalia to the Media: Go Away, Legal Times, Dec. 3, 1990, at 14;
Legal Times, Dec. 31, 1990, at 6, col. 4 (Justice Scalia noting that "the law is a specialized field,
fully comprehensible only to the experts").
71. For a discussion of the controversy over the accessibility of ancient Greek laws, see M.
GAGARIN, EARLY GREEK LAW 122-23 (1986).
72. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 68; Eskridge & Frickey, Statutory Interpretation As
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990); Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution,
72 MINN. L. REV. 1331 (1988).
73. See, e.g., R. POSNER, supra note 68, at 121-30.
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the wife $5000, secured by the home. The husband misses the first two
payments on the $5000 and then files for bankruptcy.
The wife returns to her lawyer and asks what happens next. The
advice given is tentative and uncertain. The divorce lawyer-cut from
the Sandy Stern mold-says it is hard to predict what will happen. It
depends on what the judge wants to do. 4 The bankruptcy case pro-
ceeds to judgment and the message received is different but also the
same. The court tells the wife that it is all a matter of rules. The bank-
ruptcy code allows the husband to set aside his debt to her.75 Her law-
yer was wrong. The judges do not act on whim or caprice; the internal
logic of the law mandates this seemingly unjust result. But her lawyer
was right in a different respect. The result is both inaccessible to and
unaffected by the layperson. The court determines the answer by im-
mersing itself in the legal sources and announcing a decision based on
this closed set of materials. 6 For the court the legal materials tell a
clear story. The bankruptcy code7 7 provides that a debtor may avoid
judicial liens on exempt property in which the debtor has an interest.
The wife has a judicial lien. The husband has an interest in the house
because the divorce decree awarded it to him. The house is exempt as
the husband's homestead.7 8 The result may be harsh, but this is what
the law provides; the alleged injustice cannot invade the judge's inter-
pretive domain.79
The lesson learned by the layperson is that the law remains per-
plexing and removed. The internal workings are so complex and Byzan-
tine that only a lawyer like Sandy Stern can seek to steer the client
through the process. Judicial determination confirms the inside-outside
view of law. The clear answer is found, immune to the claims of fairness
or adverse consequences.
Law need not be so disengaged from the actors in the system. Law
just as easily, and more effectively, can ask questions that seek to make
the statute more responsive to the situation. Certainly for the partici-
pants in the divorce-bankruptcy case the questions to be asked and an-
74. The empirical data on lawyer-client discourse in divorce suggest that this sort of advice is
not rare. See Sarat & Felstiner, supra note 50, at 1671-76.
75. See In re Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d 598, 605 (7th Cir.) (stating that "we are not free to disre-
gard the clear legislative judgment that debtors may avoid judicial liens of the type at issue"),
rev'd, 59 U.S.L.W. 4483 (U.S. May 23, 1991). The matter was not so clear, however, that the Eighth
and Tenth Circuits had not already ruled to the contrary. See Donahue v. Parker, 862 F.2d 259
(10th Cir. 1988); Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984).
76. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 604-05.
77. 11 U.S.C. § 522(0(1) (1988).
78. See id. § 522(d)(1) (exempting personal residence from property of the estate up to
$7500).
79. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 605.
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swered are ones more clearly tied to the real world. If the wife's debt
can be set aside in bankruptcy how will divorce practice change? Will
there be a forced sale of homes prior to the entry of a divorce decree to
ensure immediate payment to the spouse? What effect will this have on
the price obtained for the house? Will a forced sale adversely affect any
children or disrupt a home? Could a spouse retain some kind of prop-
erty interest in the home until full payment, perhaps with rent paid by
the spouse inhabiting the home? Would state law recognize such a curi-
ous interest as a property interest? How would bankruptcy law treat
such a reserved interest? Could the spouse taking the house under a
divorce decree take out a second mortgage to pay off the other spouse
immediately? Will there be enough equity in the home to take out such
a loan? Will these transaction costs adversely or disproportionately af-
fect the value of the marital estate? Does the use of bankruptcy in this
context typically occur with smaller estates.or people who would be fi-
nancially incapable of refinancing? How will lenders respond to de-
mands for this kind of credit?
Even if adopted, the pragmatic approach leaves many questions
unanswered. How does a judge with pragmatic leanings obtain the nec-
essary data or begin to analyze the data? Tentative suggestions have
been made to resolve this problem.80 If most people are ignorant of ju-
dicial methodology and care only about results-the point overlooked
by the Court in Bowers-why even care about the rhetoric of judicial
opinions? To the extent results do matter, the pragmatic approach
sometimes may lead to better results, or at least better informed re-
sults. Moreover, perhaps when judicial opinions begin to discuss what
counts, they-apart from the results-will have an educative function.
The goal may be to suggest that law is not so autonomous and that
outsiders may shape the development of legal rules. This line of analy-
sis, however, may continue to be elitist. Public opinion surveys reveal a
woefully uninformed populace.8 ' No matter what is written in judicial
opinions a large number of people will remain totally ignorant and apa-
thetic. That this is true does not mean that the baseline for defining the
audience and interpreters of judicial opinion cannot be altered
constructively.8 2
80. Davis, "There Is a Book Out..." An Analysis of Judicial Absorption of Legislative
Facts, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1539 (1987); Monahan & Walker, Social Authority: Obtaining, Evaluat-
ing, and Establishing Social Science in Law, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 477 (1986); Monahan & Walker,
Empirical Questions Without Empirical Answers (unpublished paper on file with the Author).
81. See United Auto Workers v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 914 (7th Cir. 1989)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting) (stating, "A recent poll show[s] that more than 20% of American
adults do not know that the Earth orbits the sun"), rev'd, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
82. See R. POSNER, supra note 15, at xi; R. POSNER, supra note 68, at xiii.
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IV. FACT AND FICTION
Turow's work cannot be faulted or applauded for the image of the
law he presents. It no doubt is a real image, at least in part, and is
shaped by years in the Office of the United States Attorney. He has a
concern over verisimilitude. His acknowledgments include thanks to nu-
merous physicians who assisted him on the pathology of genital herpes
that figures so prominently in the book's plot. The plot's description of
the legal system had its own special consultant, who happened also to
serve as author. Turow's goal, however, was to tell a story, not to edu-
cate the public on the law. On this account he is successful; the story is
a good one. Given the public's general ignorance about the law, how-
ever, perhaps more attention should be paid to the influence of popular
culture and the way in which it shapes the public's perception of the
law.83 The elitist vision pronounced in Turow's work is not new, either
in literature or in the law itself.8 4 As portrayed in The Burden of Proof
it may lead to differing consequences. The vision may breed a cynicism
about the law, or may enforce a sense of security that one ensnared by
the law will survive as long as the likes of Sandy Stern can be afforded
as counsel.
Producers of and commenters on popular works about the law
nonetheless may continue to believe that their toil remains far from
performing a true educative function about the law. Lawyers and legal
scholars may agree, focusing instead on that which is truly the "law."
Meanwhile, however, judges will continue to decide cases and write ju-
dicial opinions directly affecting real people. The Supreme Court this
Term will decide whether one spouse can use bankruptcy law to set
aside the other spouse's share of the marital estate awarded under a
divorce decree. 5 The Court can claim that the answer is clear, discov-
ered by it in legal sources. Or the Court perhaps can get the wrong
answer (if there is such a thing) but at least ask the right questions:
What are the consequences for people under either result? Turow al-
83. For initial efforts to examine the link, see Chase, Lawyers and Popular Culture: A Re-
view of Mass Media Portrayals of American Attorneys, 2 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 281 (1986); Stark,
Perry Mason Meets Sonny Crockett: The History of Lawyers and the Police As Television He-
roes, 42 U. MIAMi L. REv. 229 (1987); Symposium, supra note 12.
84. See Friedman, Law, Lawyers, and Popular Culture, 98 YALE L.J. 1579, 1581 (1989).
85. See Sanderfoot, 899 F.2d at 598. After this Essay went to print the Supreme Court re-
versed the Seventh Circuit and, agreeing with Judge Posner's dissent, held that a spouse's lien is
not dischargeable in bankruptcy. Farrey v. Sanderfoot, 59 U.S.L.W. 4483 (U.S. May, 23 1991). The
Court's analysis, however, is along more formalist lines, relying upon dictionary definitions, the
legislative history, and the purpose of the statute. The opinion shows little concern for the poten-
tial consequences discussed above or in Judge Posner's dissent.
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ways can claim that the educative impact on people's vision of law was
intended only as a by-product of his work. To the extent judges send
the wrong message about the law, they have no similar excuse.
